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This article assesses the effects of common features in the indirect election of presidents in 
parliamentary republics. In particular, it examines the influence of majority requirements, 
selectorate composition and uncertainty on party strategies, using Estonia (1996-2016) as a 
crucial case for analysis. The analysis demonstrates that the lack of a plurality run-off effectively 
eliminated incentives for inter-party cooperation and strategic voting. It furthermore shows that 
shifts in the partisan composition and control of the selectorate from parliament to electoral 
college provided considerable opportunities for agenda manipulation. Subsequently, results only 
rarely reflected the parliamentary balance of power. Last, although overall indicators suggest 
greater congruence between parliament and electoral college over time, this proliferated rather 
than reduced parties’ uncertainty over the electoral outcome as non-parliamentary electors voted 
based on local interests and acted independently from national party leaders. 
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The electoral functions of parliaments beyond the selection of governments are one of 
the last frontiers in legislative research. Legislatures are frequently involved in selecting 
external actors such as judges, ombudsmen, and presidents. Surprisingly, comparatively 
little is known about the specific regulations governing these contests and their effects 
on party strategies and electoral outcomes (for notable exceptions see Sieberer 2013; 
Nikolenyi 2014). 
In the context of elections in parliament, the indirect election of presidents is of 
particular scholarly and practical importance. First, indirectly elected presidents are a 
crucial check-and-balance in their respective political systems (Tavits 2008; Hloušek 
2013). In contrast to judges and ombudsmen, they perform a much more party-political 
function – although few possess far-reaching executive powers (Strohmeier 2012), 
presidents’ opposition can present serious obstacles even for strong governments 
(Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). Second, due to the office’s prominence researchers 
can rely on comparatively ample documentation and source material on their election 
(Lagerspetz 1993; 1997). Thus, even though voting is secret it is possible to gain in-
depth insights into party strategies and infer individual-level voting behaviour. Finally, 
indirectly elected presidents can not only be conceptualised as agents of assemblies 
(Samuels and Shugart 2010; see also Elster 1997; Tavits 2008; Nikolenyi 2014; Köker 
2017) but actually perceive themselves as accountable to the majorities that elected 
them (Köker 2017). Analyses of indirect presidential elections therefore also promise 
new insights on various aspects of principal-agent models and chains of accountability 
(e.g. Strøm, Bergman and Müller 2003; Lane 2007). 
The aim of this article is to contribute to the hitherto limited literature on 
indirect presidential elections by analysing the effects of three common features – 
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majority requirements, selectorate composition and uncertainty – on party strategies and 
electoral outcomes. To do so, it provides a study of presidential elections in Estonia, 
1996-2016, as a crucial case for analysis. The Estonian case particularly highlights that 
indirect presidential elections are anything but a straightforward affair. Rather, they 
involve careful strategizing by political parties and outcomes are far from 
predetermined. Furthermore, the Estonian system combines characteristics that can be 
found across other parliamentary republics. Specifically, it stipulates the election of a 
president in a unicameral parliament with a (frequently used) failsafe option in the form 
of an electoral college composed of legislators and local council representatives; 
thereby, it lacks a plurality run-off in both stages and theoretically allows for indefinite 
rounds of voting.1 The findings of this study can thus provide important starting points 
for further research – including on questions of strategic voting, agenda manipulation, 
and single-winner electoral systems – and highlight potential for comparison with other 
countries. Lastly, the case of Estonia has a particular contemporary relevance. The 
failure of parliament and electoral college to elect a president over five rounds of voting 
in 2016 has revived debates about changing the system (ERR 2016a). Therefore, it is 
timely to provide a comparative analysis of elections over time, critically evaluate the 
system’s performance to date, and discuss recommendations for reform. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, it offers a brief overview of scholarship on 
indirect presidential elections and presents two approaches that situate their study as 
part of the literature on coalition government and social choice. The second part maps 
the properties and incentive structure of the Estonian system, whereas the third part 
provides an analytical narrative of the elections to date, analysing in particular the 
effects of a lacking run-off and continuous revision of strategies. It finds that the system 
provided little incentive for parties to make serious attempts at electing a president in 
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parliament. Rather, parties chose to face the uncertainty of the electoral college where 
they – outnumbered by local electors not under party whip – subsequently had little 
control over the result. Based on these insights, the fourth part analyses the shifts in 
partisan composition and control of the selectorate from parliament to electoral college 
and gauges the power of local electors in the process. Based on original, individual-
level data on over 500 MPs and 1,000 local council electors, the analysis demonstrates 
that although overall indicators suggest that shifts in selectorate composition have 
become less dramatic, this proliferated rather than reduced parties’ uncertainty over the 
electoral outcome. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses their 
implications for recent proposals to reform the Estonian system. 
Indirect presidential elections, their importance and analytical potential 
Research on indirect presidential elections is still severely limited and largely has yet to 
be approached with the same rigour as popular presidential contests. On the most basic 
level this becomes apparent when surveying the literature on electoral systems that 
differentiates between up to five different procedures for popular presidential elections 
(Blais, Masicotte and Dobrzynska 1997; Colomer 2004; Borman and Golder 2013), 
while indirect presidential elections by parliament or electoral college are summarised 
in just one category. Thus, the – as of yet largely uncharted – diversity of rules and their 
consequences remains unappreciated.2 
The majority of research on indirect presidential elections to date takes the form 
of predominantly descriptive case studies of individual elections (e.g. Billing 1995; 
Kopecky 2008; Gloe 2009) or historical overviews (Braun 1993; Henkel 2009; Nečas 
2013) often written in the local vernacular. In addition, some information on the process 
and results of individual elections are included in case study collections (e.g. Ismayr 
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2010; Hloušek 2013) and country reports (e.g. by think tanks, political foundations or in 
the EJPR Political Data Yearbook). Nevertheless, apart from a few notable English-
language examples (e.g. Huang 2002; Clementi 2014; Köker 2019), they are rarely 
subject to the same type of coverage as popular presidential elections. 
Indirect presidential elections are far from unimportant or inconsequential – 
despite the lack of scholarly engagement with them. Presidents chosen in this manner 
are always more than mere figureheads and possess at least some discretionary power 
(Tavits 2008; Hloušek 2013; Köker 2017). Particularly the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe is abound with examples of indirectly elected presidents who used 
seemingly ceremonial powers to pursue their own goals (e.g. Vaclav Klaus’ refusal to 
sign the EU Lisbon treaty; Linek and Lacina 2010). Furthermore, as agents of 
assemblies, their election has a decisive influence on their behaviour in office (Köker 
2017; see also Oppeland 2001) and parties have a strong incentive to select a candidate 
who supports their political agenda (Elster 1997). Moreover, where supermajorities are 
required, indirect presidential elections become an important test for the cohesion of 
coalitions and established party alliances (Nikolenyi 2014),3 and can easily cause long-
term political deadlock.4 
The design of indirect presidential election procedures has a significant impact 
on electoral outcomes. Nikolenyi’s (2014) comparative analysis of indirect presidential 
elections in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Latvia – the only such 
examination to date – finds that governing coalitions are more likely to capture the 
presidential office when selection procedures for president and prime minister are 
(more) congruent. Crucially, this challenges the widely (if often only implicitly) held 
assumption that results of indirect presidential elections merely reflect the composition 
of the governmental majority. For instance, Sieberer assumes that ‘the winning 
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candidate is usually backed by the cabinet’ (2013, 518). Similarly, in their analysis of 
early government termination Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) speculate that indirect 
presidential elections may be a reflection of ‘the parliamentary balance of powers rather 
than changing it’ (ibid.: 508). The contrast between these general assumptions and 
Nikolenyi’s findings highlights that indirect presidential elections are far from 
straightforward and that there is a need to study in greater detail how parties compete 
over the presidential office in parliamentary systems. 
The rules governing indirect elections not only affect electoral outcomes but also 
determine how parties approach them strategically. This is particularly highlighted by 
Lagerspetz’ (1993; 1997) work on presidential elections in Finland, 1919-1982. During 
this period, Finnish presidents were elected by a popularly elected 300-strong electoral 
college. Although often described as a ‘quasi-popular’ presidential election, electors 
were not bound by the popular vote and voting was secret. Thus, the dynamics 
identified by Lagerspetz are equally relevant for presidential elections in parliament or 
other electoral colleges. Most prominently, the Finnish system was prone to agenda 
manipulation as ‘surprise’ candidates could be nominated in the college at any time 
(rather than already at the time of the college’s election). Furthermore, parties with 
more than sufficient votes to have their candidate advance to a run-off could engage in 
coordinated preference falsification to propel a candidate into the run-off who was 
overall less preferred than any other competitor, i.e. a Condorcet winner may have been 
eliminated early on (Lagerspetz 1993; see also Felsenthal 2012). 
Both Nikolenyi’s (2014) and Lagerspetz’ (1993; 1997) work provides promising 
analytical starting points for further study of indirect presidential elections. However, 
not all of their considerations are directly applicable to Estonia. For instance, while we 
can assume that formal rules are likewise significant for the party strategies and 
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electoral outcomes, the lack of a plurality run-off in Estonia considerably changes 
opportunities for strategic voting and agenda manipulation. Furthermore, although 
Nikolenyi (2014) provides an apt summary of Estonian presidential elections 1996-
2011, he does not engage in-depth with the uncertainty associated with local councillors 
as electors in the electoral college. Last, neither author discusses the potentially 
conflicting principals and interests of electors, e.g. those of MPs and local electors in 
Estonia,5 and Finnish electors’ loyalty to promises made to voters over surprise 
candidates that were strategically introduced by party leaders. The next section 
therefore seeks to map the incentive structure of the Estonian system by going beyond 
its general deviation from prime ministerial selection rules and discusses the more 
specific opportunities and extent of uncertainty throughout the election process. 
Mapping the incentive structure of the Estonian system 
The Estonian presidency is one of the ‘weakest’ in regional and international 
comparison in terms of constitutional powers (Metcalf 2000). Nevertheless, due to its 
discretionary powers in government formation and appointments as well as a suspensive 
veto (that incumbents can turn into a judicial review request if overridden) presidents 
are far from being inconsequential actors. This is also evidenced by the conflicts 
between president and government that characterised the first decade of Estonian 
independence (Raun 2001) even if office-holders now almost only intervene to ensure 
the constitutionality of legislation (Köker 2017). Over the years, incumbents have also 
accumulated considerable informal power and tend to be seen as ‘moral authority’ 
figures. Hence, presidents can sometimes take a more central role in the country’s 
politics than a cursory reading of constitutional stipulations may suggest. 
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Since 1996 Estonian presidents have been elected indirectly in either parliament 
or an electoral college. Thereby, the system is characterised by three particular features 
which determine the incentive structure for political parties:  
(1) there is no plurality runoff or other safeguard against cyclical preferences, thus 
theoretically allowing for indefinite rounds of voting; 
(2) multiple rounds of voting allow parties to update continuously their information 
on competitors’ preferences and revise their strategies accordingly; 
(3) the partisan composition and control of the selectorate differs greatly between 
parliament and electoral college, introducing new opportunities and varying 
levels of uncertainty. 
The presidency was a major point of contention after the country regained 
independence in 1991. Although the constitutional assembly (1991-1992) eventually 
agreed on a strongly parliamentarian constitution, the first presidential election was 
partly held by popular vote due to public pressure.6 The process for an indirect 
presidential election was described in the constitution, but only finalised with the 
passage of the President of the Republic Election Act (VPVS 1996; see Figure 1). The 
election starts in the Riigikogu (unicameral parliament), where a candidate requires a 
2/3-majority of MPs (68 of 101) to be elected. If MPs fail to elect a candidate in three 
consecutive rounds (the third round only includes the frontrunners of the second round), 
the election is transferred to the Valimiskogu (electoral college). The latter consists of 
the 101 members of parliament and over 230 representatives of local government 
councils7 who have two rounds to elect a president with an absolute majority of 
members; the second round only includes the frontrunners of the first round. Failing 
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that, the election is handed back to parliament, which has only happened once so far 
(see below). 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The requirement of absolute and super-majorities throughout the process 
presents a major obstacle to parties. Even majority governments need the support of 
further parties to elect a candidate in parliament and alternative majorities are unlikely. 
There is also little incentive for all coalition partners to act in concert as their support 
for a joint candidate in parliament is of no consequence. Furthermore, although the third 
round in parliament only includes the front-runners of the second round, it creates no 
incentives for cooperation or strategic behaviour. The failure of any candidate to 
achieve the required majority only transfers the election to the electoral college, offering 
parties whose candidate was not included a new chance. Thus, MPs will rather abstain 
than support a less-preferred candidate; similarly, preference falsification to manipulate 
the candidate field in the third round is not a worthwhile strategic behaviour. Given that 
the election in parliament is held over the course of two days, parties will also update 
their strategies in accordance with results. Parties should only cooperate at the first 
stage if they feel that the different composition of the electoral college would provide a 
less favourable environment, or if they represent less than a third of MPs and are thus 
unable to block an election in parliament on their own. 
The transfer of the election to the electoral college is then more than a mere 
continuation of the election but places it into a new bargaining environment. MPs are 
now outnumbered by local electors and hold less than a third of votes. Although a 
considerable share of local electors holds membership in one of the parliamentary 
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parties, local electors with such partisan ties are still primarily agents of local 
electorates and councils. Furthermore, a great number of councils, particularly those 
nominating only one elector, appear to choose electors based on who they will support 
in the electoral college. Local electors may thus still feel obliged to act primarily in 
accordance with their local principals rather than national party interests. Hence, the 
potential to exert control by national party leadership is lower and leaders will find it 
difficult to enforce voting discipline or enter substantial negotiations as they cannot be 
sure of the exact size of their support base. This situation shows notable parallels to 
voting behaviour of MEPs, who must decide between acting in accordance with 
interests of national parties or cross-national party groups in the European Parliament 
(cf. Hix 2002). 
The electoral college provides slightly greater opportunity for agenda 
manipulation than the election in parliament. Although the final two candidates from 
parliament are automatically transferred to the college, groups of at least 21 MPs and/or 
local council electors can torpedo party strategies by nominating new candidates (or re-
nominating those that were eliminated in parliament). However, greater uncertainty 
over electors’ preferences and the lowered majority requirement compared to 
parliament mean that falsification of preferences, i.e. strategically voting for a less-
preferred candidate to eliminate a Condorcet winner, is once again hardly a viable 
strategy. It may even backfire by eliminating one’s most preferred candidate. If no 
candidate is elected in the first round, inter-party negotiations are only promising if 
there is a clearly identifiable and disciplined group that could push one of the 
frontrunners over the 50%+1 mark. Otherwise, the lack of a plurality run-off once again 
means that there is almost as little incentive for parties to cooperate as in the last 
parliamentary round. 
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Finally, formal rules are not the only factors determining the incentive structure 
of the election. Indirect presidential elections do not take place solely in the confines of 
parliament (or electoral college) but their course and results are observed by the wider 
electorate. Thus, they present an opportunity for parties to present themselves in a 
favourable light and send signals to their voters (cf. Keh 2015; Sieberer 2013). 
Furthermore, the relatively weak position of the Estonian presidency in everyday 
politics means that the substantive policy-orientation of candidates is not as important to 
parties as their promise not to interfere in the policy process (cf. Elster 1997). Given 
that there has also been sizable support for the introduction of popular presidential 
elections since the 1990s (Raun 1997), parties may be tempted to present candidates 
popular with the general population in order to increase pressure on others to vote for 
their nominee. This applies most to parties whose candidate is unlikely to emerge 
victorious in any case and that can subsequently reap the benefits of blaming other 
parties for denying the public ‘their’ candidate. Considerations about the publicity 
potential of the election are thus equally important for party strategies as formal rules 
(cf. Köker 2019). 
From exception to the rule: Estonian presidential elections, 1996-2016 
Few presidential elections in Estonia have been without surprises and complications. In 
every election so far, parties have (usually unsuccessfully) tried to agree on a joint 
candidate that could be elected in parliament. Nevertheless, the success of such 
endeavours was regularly hindered by individual parties in government or opposition 
that saw greater benefits in forcing an election in the electoral college and only 
nominated their main candidates at this later stage. Since 1996, election in the electoral 
college has thus been the norm rather than the exception. Furthermore, each election 
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impinged on the current political situation, bringing conflicts into the open and even 
contributing to the downfall of governments. This section examines the elections, 1996-
2016, as part of an analytical narrative that highlights in particular the complications 
arising from the lack of a plurality run-off and the continuous revisions of party 
strategies. To aid the analysis, a comprehensive summary of results is available in Table 
1. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
1996. In the first entirely indirect presidential election a two-thirds majority in 
parliament for any candidate was unlikely from the start. The government failed to 
agree on a joint candidate – the Reform Party (RE) supported incumbent Lennart Meri, 
the Country’s People’s Party (EME) supported 1992 runner-up Arnold Rüütel, and the 
Progress Party (AP) as well as the Coalition Party (EK; the largest party group) did not 
nominate any candidate. This split should prove indicative of further disagreements in 
the coalition as the RE left the government only two months later. Pro Patria (IL) had 
nominated Meri for his first term, yet refused to support him due to his frequent 
activism (Tavits 2008: 62), so that both Meri and Rüütel were dependent on opposition 
MPs to secure their nomination. During the three rounds in parliament, MPs rather 
abstained or failed to show up instead of supporting either candidate. The different 
composition of the electoral college then allowed IL to nominate its own candidate, 
Tunne-Väldo Kelam, who subsequently came close to preventing Rüütel from 
advancing to the second round. This, together with the fact that two further candidates 
were introduced (one by local electors alone and one in collaboration with MPs), 
highlights not only the uncertainty introduced by the change of bargaining environment 
but also the incentives for parties to wait for more favourable conditions in the electoral 
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college. Eventually, Meri and Rüütel went head to head once again and Meri was 
elected for a second term. 
2001. A split in the government coalition and an unusually united opposition made an 
election in parliament unlikely once again (Huang 2002). The Moderate’s (MD) 
nomination of their party leader Andres Tarand was not supported by its coalition 
partners (IL and RE) and as more than a third of opposition MPs supported the 
nomination of Centre Party (KE) MP Peeter Kreitzberg, an election in parliament was 
impossible. In the electoral college an alliance of 68 local electors and 10 MPs from six 
different parties surprisingly nominated Arnold Rüütel, whereas the RE used its 
increased presence in the electoral college to nominate speaker of parliament, Toomas 
Savi. The new candidates beat out those still nominated in parliament, highlighting once 
again the effects of a changed bargaining environment and the fact that parties have 
little incentive to cooperate in parliament if they can field their own candidate in the 
college. The last round, which Rüütel won with a razor-thin majority, underscores the 
danger of cyclical preferences as part of the system. Had only three more electors 
abstained or voted for Savi, the election would have gone back to parliament. Given the 
loss of partisan control in the college, it could be asserted that it is thanks to pure 
coincidence that a president was elected in this instance. Moreover, Rüütel’s victory 
provides a striking illustration of how the principal-agent relationship between local 
councils and their electors trumped national party goals. 196 of the 266 electors 
represented municipalities of less than 3,000 voters which would have been abolished or 
transformed under government plans (Huang 2002) – voting for the more regionally-
oriented opposition candidate Rüütel was thus clearly an expression of local interests. 
Last, the election proved to be a catalyst in the downfall of the government as the failure 
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to agree on a joint candidate exacerbated other conflicts between governing parties 
(Köker 2017: 96). 
2006. After the lengthy two-stage elections in 1996 and 2001, parties tried to agree on a 
joint candidate in all-party talks. Yet, after the KE founds its potential candidates 
eliminated as part of the negotiations, it joined forces with the People’s Union (RL) and 
blocked a two-thirds majority for speaker of parliament, Ene Ergma, as well as for 
Social Democratic Party (SDE) MEP Toomas Hendrik Ilves (Pettai 2007). As both 
parties supported Rüütel’s re-election, the electoral college provided a much more 
favourable environment. KE and RL had done well in the 2005 local elections and thus 
held almost 40% in the electoral college, so that Rüütel was eventually nominated by 
158 of 347 electors (45.5%). Yet, parties were very aware of the uncertainty posed by 
electors not under direct partisan control, as evidenced by the fierce conflict over two 
disqualified electors (Pettai 2007) who would have added one seat each to RL and RE. 
This fear proved right after Rüütel only gained four additional votes while Ilves won 
with just one vote above the absolute majority required – a fact later seen as having 
contributed to the RL’s poor performance in the 2007 parliamentary elections (Pettai 
2008) and subsequent demise. Similarly to the 2001 election it is unlikely that avoiding 
a return to parliament was due to parties’ strategic behaviour rather than mere luck. 
2011. The 2011 presidential election is the only occasion to date where a presidential 
candidate received a two-thirds majority in parliament right away. The government 
parties RE and Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) as well as Ilves’ former SDE 
(which had been a coalition partner of RE and IRL until 2009) held 75 of 101 seats and 
supported his re-election. Although the KE surprisingly nominated independent MEP 
Indrek Tarand and neither candidate received the full support of their respective party 
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groups, Ilves was re-elected without problems (Sikk 2012). There are several factors 
that facilitated compromise on this occasion but not on others. First, parliament was 
composed of just four parties, so that party preferences were easy to ascertain from the 
start. Second and just as importantly, in contrast to previous elections a two-thirds 
majority was possible, so that incentives for cooperation were higher than ever. 
Thereby, KE’s surprise nomination cannot be seen as a serious attempt to block Ilves’ 
re-election, but rather an attempt to benefit from increased publicity. Finally, Ilves as 
president had been much less activist and confrontative than his predecessors Meri and 
Rüütel (Köker 2017: 106) who had subsequently had greater problems in rallying 
parties behind them (see e.g. IL’s refusal to re-nominate Meri). This would suggest that 
behaviour in office rather than incumbency as such helped facilitate compromise. 
2016. The presidential election of 2016 has been the most lengthy and complicated one 
to date. Once again, no clear majority emerged and the government parties (RE, IRL 
and SDE) failed to agree on a joint candidate – RE and SDE nominated speaker of 
parliament Eiki Nestor (SDE) for the first round and former prime minister and EU 
commissioner Siim Kallas (RE) for the second. The KE nominated its deputy leader 
Mailis Reps and the IRL joined forces with the Free Party (EVA) to nominate former 
Chancellor of Justice Allar Jõks. Predictably, none achieved even a 50% majority and 
parties hedged their bets on the electoral college. As only Reps’ and Kallas’ candidacies 
were automatically transferred, RE and EVA once again nominated Jõks, while the 
Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) nominated its leader Mart Helme, having failed to 
collect enough nominating signatures in parliament. In a surprising twist, non-partisan 
Marina Kaljurand (who had previously been the public’s preferred candidate) shook up 
the candidate field by stepping down as foreign minister and announcing her candidacy 
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(supported by 22 local electors and 4 SDE MPs). Thus, not only did parties rely on local 
electors to nominate their candidates but local electors also became active themselves. 
In the first round all candidates (except Helme) were neck-to-neck. Kallas and 
Jõks (rather than the surprisingly third-placed Kaljurand) entered the second round, yet 
parties and local electors were clearly unsatisfied with either option. The constellation 
of parties in the college also made it impossible to conduct any meaningful negotiations. 
Even in the highly unlikely scenario that either Kallas’ or Jõks’ camp had been able to 
win the support of one of the eliminated candidates, they could not have crossed the 
absolute majority threshold without additional votes. Given the difficulty of imposing 
any kind of voting discipline and the fact that according to a survey of electors Reps and 
Kaljurand were overall favoured as second choices (ERR 2016b), it is not surprising 
that neither candidate received the required majority and the vote was handed back to 
parliament. 
In parliament, all previous candidates were considered ‘burned’ and also showed 
no interest in being nominated again. Hence, voting theories would have predicted a 
continuation of the election in which parties gather new information on each other’s 
preferences and hope to use the uncertainty of the electoral college to their advantage 
once again. Yet, public pressure and attempts to contain the damage to their public 
image now trumped self-interested behaviour by political parties, highlighting the 
importance of factors beyond formal rules in shaping the system’s incentive structure. 
Eventually, all parties bar the EKRE agreed to nominate non-partisan Kersti Kaljulaid, a 
former member of the European Court of Auditors, who was then elected in the first 
round. Despite this ostensibly conciliatory ending, the election once again revealed 
deep-seated conflicts between coalition partners. Likewise, it demonstrated the loss of 
authority of the RE as the leading party and presented the KE as a potential alternative 
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that had been hitherto snubbed by other mainstream parties (Mölder 2017). Only a 
month after Kaljulaid’s election, the government lost a vote of confidence and was 
replaced by a new coalition under KE leadership. 
In sum, the system provided little incentive for parties to make serious attempts 
at electing a president in parliament. In addition, conflicts between governing parties in 
seeking to agree on a joint candidate regularly amplified existing conflicts and led to the 
downfall of more than one government, highlighting the political significance of 
indirect presidential elections beyond the mere selection of a new head of state. On the 
whole, parties rather chose to face the uncertainty of the electoral college where they – 
outnumbered by local electors not under party whip – subsequently had little control 
over the result. It was only in 2011 that parliament’s partisan composition and low 
fragmentation allowed for an election in the first round of voting. Therefore, the next 
section now turns to the shifts in partisan composition and control of the selectorate 
from parliament to electoral college and analyses the power of local electors in the 
process. 
Shifts in partisan composition and control of the selectorate and the role of 
local electors 
The change in the partisan composition from parliament to electoral college created 
specific opportunities for parties – to see a candidate elected who would not have 
gained a majority in parliament, or to manipulate the agenda in their favour by 
nominating additional candidates. At the same time, the majority of local electors 
experienced conflicting loyalties between local and national principals which introduced 
varying levels of uncertainty. Last, electors repeatedly became a force to challenge the 
dominance of political parties by rejecting the choices put before them or by nominating 
their own candidates. 
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Until now, the vast differences in the composition of the electoral college 
compared to parliament were alluded to (e.g. Huang 2002; Lagerspetz and Maier 2010; 
Pettai 2007; Pettai, Toomla and Joakit 2008), yet not precisely measured. In contrast, 
this section relies on an original individual-level data set on the partisan allegiances and 
preferences of over 500 MPs and 1,000 local council electors, allowing for a 
considerably more nuanced analysis. The basis of the data set are lists of local electors 
obtained from the Estonian Electoral Commission (VVK n.d.). In several steps, these 
were matched with the VVK’s local elections data base (giving electors’ municipality 
and local party affiliation) and compared to party lists in the preceding parliamentary 
election and the national party membership data base (revealing potential simultaneous 
national party affiliations) before being complemented by information about local 
council offices (i.e. chair/deputy chair). MPs’ party affiliation was inferred from voting 
records at the time of the election to capture any changes since the last legislative 
elections. Last, the names of MPs and local electors were cross-referenced with 
signatures on nomination forms for individual candidates obtained from the VKK. 
Shifts in the partisan composition and loss of control by parliamentary parties 
The transfer of the presidential election from parliament to the electoral college not only 
lowers the majority required to elect a candidate, but also ensures that a differently 
composed selectorate chooses the president. Thus, a shift away from the exclusive 
control MPs and parliamentary parties was intentional. However, this shift has been 
exacerbated by the fact that Estonian local politics has long been structured by local 
electoral alliances, not competition between large national parties (see Pettai, Toomla 
and Joakit 2008). Table 2 illustrates shifts in the partisan composition and control 
between parliament and electoral college using two measures: (1) the effective number 
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of parties Np (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), capturing the varying differences in the 
fragmentation of parliament and electoral college, and (2) Pedersen’s (1979) index of 
electoral volatility Vp, gauging – somewhat experimentally – the relative loss of control 
by parliamentary parties. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Similarly to other Central and East European countries, Estonia’s parliament 
was highly fragmented throughout the 1990s. Although fragmentation decreased over 
time, parliament still contained 9.37 effective parties at the time of the 1996 presidential 
elections. Nevertheless, the party landscape was even more diverse at the local level so 
that the first electoral college counted an astronomical number of effective parties 
(Np=66.48, more than seven times that of parliament). This mismatch was still present 
in the 2001 elections, albeit strongly reduced. From 2006 onward the fragmentation of 
parliament was then largely mirrored in that of the electoral college.8 The decrease in 
fragmentation was only partly matched by a decrease in volatility between parliament 
and electoral college – volatility exceeded 60% in 1996 and 2001 and was reduced by 
half over time, whereas fragmentation decreased six-fold.  
The drastic decrease in the electoral college’s fragmentation and volatility was 
largely due to a lower number of electors from local lists and alliances. However, this 
was not a ‘natural’ development but part of a conscious effort by national political 
parties to consolidate and enhance their own position. Triggered by the unpredictability 
and power exhibited by local electors in the 2001 presidential elections, national parties 
twice tried to outlaw local electoral alliances altogether. Although both attempts were 
overturned by the Supreme Court, they significantly weakened alliances and helped 
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national parties to permeate local party competition (Pettai, Toomla and Joakit 2008). 
Additionally, these changes went hand in hand with a territorial reform that decreased 
the overall number of local electors. Hereby, a number of smaller municipalities was 
merged, yet without increasing their size so much that it would have granted them 
additional (or at least the same number of) electors. 
The decrease in fragmentation and volatility as well as parties’ conscious efforts 
to weaken local alliances notwithstanding, it failed to decrease bargaining costs or 
uncertainty for political parties. On the one hand, the lower fragmentation in the 
electoral college was linked to the simultaneous emergence of larger and more united 
local groupings. These controlled seat shares similar to those of some smaller 
parliamentary parties so that national parties could no longer determine the agenda on 
their own – something that had largely still been possible in the 1996 and 2001 
elections. On the other hand, the greater dominance of national parties meant that the 
electoral college began to exhibit almost the same conflict lines as the election in 
parliament. Thus, although the college was designed to break deadlocks arising from 
everyday national politics, it started to merely replicate them. 
The role and power of local electors 
The role and power of local electors in the Estonian is primarily characterised by two 
aspects: party leaders’ uncertainty of their preferences and voting behaviour, and 
electors’ right to nominate additional candidates. The first aspect is particularly 
interesting because individual electors, although elected as part of local lists/alliances 
and representing these in the electoral college, often held membership in national 
political parties at the same time. In contrast, the second aspect relates more to strongly 
to electors’ ability to manipulate the agenda and cooperate with smaller national parties 
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whose candidates would have had no chance in parliament. 
Local electors in the college, particularly those from local lists and alliances, felt 
conflicted between local and national pressures, which was most clearly demonstrated 
in the case of the 2001 election. Therefore, party leaders’ potential to exert pressure on 
electors was limited and affiliation in national parties did not significantly reduce the 
uncertainty and costs associated with organising majorities for political parties. In fact, 
less than a quarter of all local electors 1996-2016 had run for national office and all but 
a handful had done so for the (national) party they represented in the electoral college. 
Thus, party leaders could not easily bait electors, e.g. through offering (better) list 
placements in the next parliamentary election. The exact degree of party leaders’ 
uncertainty over local electors’ voting behaviour is difficult to ascertain from the 
outside (and would certainly merit further research). Nevertheless, the conscious efforts 
of national parties to abolish local alliances (cf. Pettai, Toomla and Joakin 2008) can be 
interpreted as evidence that such uncertainty was far from negligible. 
Local electors (passively) gained further weight through the unpredictability of 
their selection. Until legislation was passed in 2010 (ERR 2010) councils did not follow 
a uniform set of rules when selecting electors and often did so only a few days before 
the convention of the college. This severely hampered party leaders’ ability to 
coordinate a majority for their preferred candidates and forced them adjust their 
strategies under time pressure. While about 60% of local councils since 2001 nominated 
the council chairperson,9 this did little to reduce uncertainty – council chairs were even 
less likely to be part of national parties and thus potentially felt more strongly obligated 
to follow local interests. 
Since the first election, local electors have been a force of their own when it 
came to influencing the process of electing a president – even if it only became most 
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visible in the last election. While they were always important by virtue of their numbers 
(outnumbering MPs by 1:2.3 in 2016, down from 1:2.7 in 1996), they faced high 
coordination costs in the early years. Nevertheless, except for the candidacies of Arnold 
Rüütel in 2006 and Allar Jõks in 2016 (who also had a sufficient number of MPs to 
support their nomination), local electors were either the sole driver or otherwise crucial 
to nominating additional candidates in the electoral college (Table 3).  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The great power wielded by local electors independently of political parties 
became particularly evident in 2016. First, local electors were the driving force in 
renominating Allar Jõks (who, however, also received support from 21 MPs) and 
putting EKRE leader Mart Helme on the ballot. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
local electors were key to nominating Marina Kaljurand, whose quasi-independent 
candidacy introduced a novelty to Estonian presidential elections. Although politicians 
had previously publicly declared their readiness to run for president, none had taken it 
upon themselves to seek out support for their nomination, but rather waited for political 
parties to consider their candidacy. Third and last, the failure of the electoral college to 
elect a candidate among the two front-runners can – as outlined above – largely be 
attributed to the preferences of local electors. 
Overall, one can assert that although overall indicators suggest that shifts in selectorate 
composition have become less dramatic and parties retained greater control, this 
proliferated rather than reduced uncertainty over the electoral outcome and vested local 
electors with greater power. The more equal distribution of parties’ strength in parliament 
and electoral college reduced their capability to present candidates with a credible chance 
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of capturing the presidency. Paradoxically, the greater permeation of local politics by 
national parties placed even greater power in the hands of electors representing local lists 
and alliances who subsequently acted in accordance with a different set of preferences.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Estonia is a crucial case for the analysis of indirect presidential elections – both in the 
post-communist context and in comparative perspective. It not only demonstrates that 
indirect presidential elections are far from a straightforward affair and outcomes rarely 
reflect the parliamentary balance of power, but allows for assessing the effects of formal 
and informal institutions on party strategies. Although the overall design of the Estonian 
system may be somewhat unique, it still combines a number of common characteristics 
that can be found across other parliamentary republics, thus providing promising 
starting points for future research and comparison. Lastly, given current efforts to 
change the system after the failure to elect a new president over five rounds in 2016, the 
case of Estonia also has a particular contemporary relevance. 
The analysis of presidential elections 1996-2016 in this study showed that the 
requirement for supermajorities throughout the process provided a major obstacle for 
parties. In particular, it minimized incentives to make serious attempts at electing a 
president in parliament. Rather, parties chose to face the uncertainty of the electoral 
college where they – outnumbered by local electors not under party whip – 
subsequently had little control over the result. Here, electors from local lists and 
alliances felt torn between local and national interests. Thus, although overall indicators 
suggest that shifts in selectorate composition became less dramatic – in part thanks to 
national parties’ attempts to bring local politics under their control – this proliferated 
rather than reduced uncertainty over the electoral outcome and provided local electors 
with greater agency. In the end, presidential elections not only became a catalyst for 
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coalition conflict, accelerating the downfall of several governments, but the electoral 
college was often unable to break deadlocks arising from national politics. 
The results of study now also allows us to critically review recent proposals to 
reform the Estonian system. Thereby, the key question is whether such reforms would 
provide greater incentives for cooperation between parties and, more importantly, will 
prevent cyclical preferences. Plans currently debated in parliament envisage the 
electoral college as the sole electoral body (ERR 2017) – this would simplify the 
process to the extent that parties could focus on a single electoral body and remove the 
(largely inconsequential) posturing during the first three rounds in parliament. 
Nevertheless, it would not necessarily increase incentives for cooperation. Furthermore, 
plans also foresee an increased dominance of local electors in the process – 422 local 
electors plus 101 MPs – whose numbers would otherwise have been reduced to 107 due 
to administrative reform (ibid.). A greater number of local electors (and the proposed 
minimum of two per municipality) may increase national party dominance and, as a 
consequence, reduce the unpredictability of the election. However, groups of local 
electors would still be able propose their own candidates and parties may struggle to 
agree on common candidates if the college replicates the fault lines of national politics. 
The lack of a natural endpoint remains the greatest problem of the Estonian 
system. Therefore, the proposal to hold a sequence of five rounds including a final run-
off in the new and enlarged electoral college seems particularly promising (ERR 2017). 
Five rounds would provide a fairer process of reducing the number of candidates step-
by-step and allow parties to revise and negotiate (joint) strategies in a more orderly 
fashion. Research on direct presidential contests also shows that parties will rather 
cooperate when faced with a relative majority threshold, than with an absolute majority 
requirement (Pérez-Liñán 2006). Most importantly, a run-off would ensure that a 
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president would be elected in the end. Nevertheless, the final run-off remains one of the 
most controversial aspects of the reform proposals (along with the suggestion to limit 
incumbency to a single seven-year term). In particular, politicians and experts alike 
seem to feel that a – potentially small – relative majority may not provide a president 
with sufficient legitimacy (see e.g. Kilp 2016). However, no other solutions to the 
problem of indefinite rounds of voting have been proposed. Based on the findings of 
study, it appears likely that if parties fail to instate a run-off, deadlocks and cyclical 
preferences are likely to return as part of the reformed system. 
There is yet too little (comparative) research that would allow for further 
recommendations. Nevertheless, the analysis of the Estonian case and current debates 
still help to formulate a research agenda on indirect presidential elections. First, future 
research needs to address the effects of run-offs on electoral outcomes. For instance, 
Germany has (re-)elected all but one of its presidents since 1949 with a 50%+1 majority 
despite employing a run-off in a college composed of MPs and state electors – yet, the 
question remains whether this is due to formal rules or other factors. Second, it is 
uncertain whether other measures could incentivise political parties to agree on a 
candidate under absolute/supermajority requirement, such as the threat of parliamentary 
dissolution in case of an unsuccessful election (as is the case in Greece or Kosovo). 
Third and most importantly, any research seeking to understand indirect presidential 
elections and to formulate empirically substantiated reform proposals first requires a 
more comprehensive mapping and comparison of procedures and their incentive 
structure. Only this would allow us to connect the study of indirect presidential 
elections with that on other single-winner electoral systems (e.g. Felsenthal 2012), and 
to gauge whether procedures found in other countries may provide a solution to 
problems found in Estonia or elsewhere. 




1 Germany and India also include electors in the process that are not members of national 
parliaments, whereas Albania and Italy likewise lack a plurality run-off; furthermore, the 
vast majority of indirect presidential elections consist of at least three rounds of voting. 
2 For instance, parliamentary republics in the EU alone (Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, and Malta) all use systems that differ at least in one of either selectorate 
composition, majority requirements, or number of rounds (Sikk 2006). 
3 Conversely, they can also provide an opportunity to test out new coalitions (Sieberer 2013). 
4 Recent examples of this are the failure of to elect presidents in Moldova, 2009-2012, or 
Lebanon, 2014-2016. 
5 Or lower house deputies and senators in the Czech Republic (1993-2008). 
6 A candidate needed 50%+1 of votes to win in the first round, but a runoff would be held in 
parliament if no candidate received a majority (Taagepera 1994). 
7 Municipalities send one to ten electors based on size; the total number of electors decreased 
from 273 in 1996 to 234 in 2016 to due territorial reform (see also Table 1). 
8 While it is not possible to simulate the exact composition of a potential electoral college for 
2011, its fragmentation probably would have been similar to that of 2006 (lower 
fragmentation of parliament coupled with heavy losses for RL in the 2009 local elections). 
9 164 of 254 councils nominated their chairperson in 2001, 128 of 232 in 2006, and 136 of 213 
in 2016. 
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Table 1. Candidates and results in Estonian presidential elections, 1996-2016 
Year Candidates Supporting parties 
Parliament  Electoral College 
1st round 2nd round 3rd round  4th round 5th round 
Votes % Votes % Votes %  Votes % Votes % 
1996 Lennart Meri MD, RE* 45 44.6 49 48.5 52 51.5  139 37.2 196 52.4 
 Arnold Rüütel EME*, PRL, 
ML 
34 33.7 34 33.7 32 31.7  85 22.7 126 33.7 
 Tunne-Väldo Kelam IL, various a)        76 20.3   
 Enn Tõugu various b)        47 12.6   
 Siiri Oviir local electors        25 6.7   
 Invalid votes  2 2.0 1 1.0 1 1.0    6 1.6 
 Abstentions/blank votes  14 13.9 12 11.9 11 10.9    44 11.8 
 Missing MPs/Electors  6 5.9 5 5.0 5 5.0      
 Total  101 100 101 100 101 100  374 100 374 100 
              
2001 Peeter Kreitzberg KE, EK, RL 40 39.6 36 35.6 33 32.7  72 19.6   
 Andres Tarand MD*, various c) 38 37.6          
 Peeter Tulviste IL*, various c)   35 34.7 33 32.7  89 24.3   
 Arnold Rüütel RL, various d)        114 31.1 186 50.7 
 Toomas Savi RE*        90 24.5 155 42.2 
 Invalid votes    1 1.0      2 0.5 
 Abstentions/blank votes  13 12.9 19 18.8 24 23.8  1 0.3 23 6.3 
 Missing MPs/Electors  10 9.9 10 9.9 11 10.9      
 Total  101 100 101 100 101 100  367 100 367 100 
              
2006 Ene Ergma RP, KE, RL, 
SDE* e) 
65 64.4          
 Toomas Hendrik Ilves SDE*; RP, KE, 
RL e) 
  64 63.4 64 63.4  174 50.4   
 Arnold Rüütel RL various e)        162 47.0   
 Invalid votes         1 0.3   
 Abstentions/blank votes    1 1.0 1 1.0  8 2.3   
 Missing MPs/Electors  36 35.6 36 35.6 36 35.6      
 Total  101 100 101 100 101 100  345 100   
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Table 1. Candidates and results in Estonian presidential elections, 1996-2016 (continued) 
Year Candidates Supporting parties 
Parliament  Electoral College 
1st round 2nd round 3rd round  4th round 5th round 
Votes % Votes % Votes %  Votes % Votes % 
2011 Toomas Hendrik Ilves RE*, IRL*, 
SDE 
73 72.3          
 Indrek Tarand KE 25 24.8          
 Invalid votes  2 2.0          
 Abstentions/blank votes  1 1.0          
 Missing MPs/Electors             
 Total  101 100          
              
2016 Eiki Nestor SDE*, RE* 40 39.6          
(1) Mailis Reps KE  26 25.7 32 31.7 26 25.7  79 23.6   
 Allar Jõks IRL*, EVA 25 24.8 21 20.8    83 24.8 134 40.0 
 Siim Kallas RE*, SDE*   45 44.6 42 41.6  81 24.2 138 41.2 
 Marina Kaljurand various g)        75 22.4   
 Mart Helme EKRE        16 4.8   
 Invalid votes           3 0.9 
 Abstentions/blank votes  8 7.9 1 1.0 30 29.7    57 17.0 
 Missing MPs/Electors  2 2.0 2 2.0 3 3.0  1 0.3 2 0.6 
 Total  101 100 101 100 101 100  335 100 335 100 
              
2016 
(2)  
Kersti Kaljulaid RE*, SDE*, 
IRL*, KE, 
EVA 
81 80.2          
 Invalid votes             
 Abstentions/blank votes  17 16.8          
 Missing MPs/Electors  3 3.0          
 Total  101 100          
Notes: The candidate’s party is underlined; * denotes government party; a) including 4 independent MPs; b) including individual EK and AP MPs; c) nomination forms for 
Tarand and Tulviste were co-signed by a handful of MD and IL MPs, respectively; d) including 1 MD MP and four KE MPs in addition to local electors; e) nomination forms 
signed by the majority of these parties’ MPs; f) in addition to 122 local electors this included individual MPs from RE, RL, RP and SDE; g) this included 4 SDE MPs. For 
party abbreviations see Table 2. 
Source: VVK (n.d.); Huang 2002; Pettai 2007; Sikk 2012; Sikk 2018. 
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Table 2. Shifting selectorate composition between parliament and electoral college, 
1996-2016 
  Parliament College Difference 
Year Party Total % Total %  
1996 Koonderakond - EK (Coalition Party)* 19 18.8 25 6.7 -12.1 
 Reformierakond - RE (Reform Party)* 17 16.8 17 4.5 -12.3 
 Isamaaliit - IL (Pro Patria) 9 8.9 17 4.5 -4.4 
 Keskerakond - KE (Centre Party) 9 8.9 10 2.7 -6.2 
 Maarahva Erakond - EME 
(Country People’s Party)* 
8 7.9 8 2.1 -5.8 
 Arengupartei - AP (Progress Party)* 7 6.9 7 1.9 -5.1 
 Maaliit - EML (Rural Union) 7 6.9 7 1.9 -5.1 
 Mõõdukad - MD (Moderates) 6 5.9 6 1.6 -4.3 
 Pensionäride ja Perede Liit - PRL 
(Pensioner’s & Family League) 
6 5.9 6 1.6 -4.3 
 Vene fraktsioon (Russian faction) 6 5.9 6 1.6 -4.3 
 Non-affiliated/independent 7 6.9 28 7.5 +0.6 
 Local lists & non-parliamentary parties   237 67.4 +63.4 
 Total 101 100 374 100  
  NP = 9.37 NP =66.48 VP = 64.0 
       
2001 Keskerakond - KE (Centre Party) 28 27.7 47 12.8 -14.9 
 Isamaaliit - IL (Pro Patria)* 18 17.8 25 6.8 -11.0 
 Reformierakond - RE (Reform Party)* 18 17.8 32 8.7 -9.1 
 Mõõdukad - MD (Moderates)* 17 16.8 17 4.6 -12.2 
 Rahvaliit - RL (People’s Union) 7 6.9 7 1.9 -5.0 
 Koonderakond - EK (Coalition Party) 6 5.9 6 1.6 -4.3 
 Ühendatud Rahvapartei - EÜRP 
(United People’s Party) 
5 5.0 5 1.4 -3.6 
 Non-affiliated/independent 2 2.0 3 0.8 -1.2 
 Local lists & non-parliamentary parties   225 61.3 +61.3 
 Total 101 100 367 100  
  NP = 5.57 NP =25.97 VP = 61.3 
       
2006 Res Publica - RP 25 24.8 38 11.0 -13.7 
 Keskerakond - KE (Centre Party)* 21 20.8 57 16.5 -4.3 
 Reformierakond (Reform Party)* 19 18.8 51 14.8 -4.0 
 Rahvaliit - RL (People’s Union)* 13 12.9 76 22.0 +9.2 
 Isamaaliit - IL (Pro Patria) 7 6.9 12 3.5 -3.5 
 Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond - SDE 
(Social Democratic Party) 
6 5.9 14 4.1 -1.9 
 Non-affiliated/independent 10 9.9 11 3.2 -6.7 
 Local lists & non-parliamentary parties   86 24.9 +24.9 
 Total 101 100 345 100  
  NP = 6.03 NP =8.74 VP =34.1 
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Table 2. Shifting selectorates between parliament and electoral college, 1996-2016 
(continued) 
  Parliament College Difference 
Year Party Total % Total %  
2011 Reformierakond - RE (Reform Party)* 31 30.7    
 Keskerakond - KE (Centre Party) 21 20.8    
 Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit - IRL 
(Pro Patria and Res Publica Union)* 
20 19.8    
 Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond - SDE 
(Social Democratic Party) 
18 17.8    
 Non-affiliated/independent 11 10.1    
 Total 101 100    
  NP = 4.77    
       
2016 Reformierakond - RE (Reform Party)* 29 28.7 63 18.8 -9.9 
 Keskerakond - KE (Centre Party) 27 26.7 57 17.0 -9.7 
 Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond - SDE 
(Social Democratic Party)* 
15 14.9 45 13.4 -1.4 
 Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit - IRL 
(Pro Patria and Res Publica Union)* 
14 13.9 40 11.9 -1.9 
 Vabaerakond - EVA (Free Party) 8 7.9 8 2.4 -5.5 
 Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond - EKRE 
(Conservative People’s Party) 
7 6.9 10 3.0 -3.9 
 Non-affiliated/independent 1 1.0 2 0.6 -0.4 
 Local lists & non-parliamentary parties   110 32.8 +32.8 
 Total 101 100 335 100  
  NP =4.85 NP =10.38 VP =32.8 
Notes: * denotes government party. NP = Effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; 
independents treated as single-deputy parties); VP = Pedersen’s (1979) Volatility Index. 
Source: VVK (n.d.); Sikk 2018. 
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Table 3. Electors’ support for candidate nominations in the Electoral College 
Year Candidate Number of electors supporting nomination MPs Local electors Total 
1996 Tunne-Väldo Kelam 12 28 40 
 Enn Tõugu  21 21 
 Siiri Oviir 9 14 23 
     
2001 Arnold Rüütel 10 68 78 
 Toomas Savi 18 38 56 
     
2006 Arnold Rüütel 36 122 158 
     
2016 Allar Jõks 21 29 50 
 Marina Kaljurand 4 22 26 
 Mart Helme 7 14 21 
Notes: Support of a minimum of 21 MPs and/or local electors is required for a nomination in the electoral 
college. 
Source: VVK (n.d.). 
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Source: Own figure based on VPSP (1996). 
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4th round 
Candidates from the 3rd round advance 
automatically; nominations of additional 
candidates by 21 MPs and/or local electors 
5th round 
Only frontrunners from 4th round advance; 
no new nominations 
No candidate achieves 
required majority 
Candidate elected with absolute 
majority of all electors (50%+1) 
No candidate achieves 
required majority 
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